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Abstract—We present the first adversarial framework that
crafts perturbations that mislead classifiers by accounting for
the content of the images and the semantics of the labels.
The proposed framework combines deep neural networks and
traditional image processing filters, which define the type and
magnitude of the adversarial perturbation. We also introduce
a semantic adversarial loss that guides the training of a fully
convolutional neural network to generate adversarial images that
will be classified with a label that is semantically different from
the label of the original (clean) image. We analyse the limitations
of existing methods that do not account for the semantics of
the labels and evaluate the proposed framework, FilterFool, on
ImageNet and with three object classifiers, namely ResNet50,
ResNet18 and AlexNet. We discuss its success rate, robustness
and transferability to unseen classifiers.
I. INTRODUCTION
DEEP Neural Networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to craftedperturbations that can be added to images and cause mis-
classification [1], [2]. Perturbations can be created by norm-
bounded adversarial attacks [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10],
which limit the lp distortion, or by content-based adversarial
attacks, which consider specific image properties [11], [12],
[13], [14], [15]. An adversarial attack can be mitigated by
the use of empirical or certified defences. Empirical defences
include adversarial training [3] and input-based transforma-
tion, such as feature squeezing [16] and compression [17].
Certified defences adjust the parameters of the DNN for its
prediction to remain consistent within an lp bound of the
original (clean) image [18]. Examples of certified defences
include PixelDP [19] and randomised smoothing [20].
Norm-bounded perturbations limit the amount of change
for the value of each pixel (e.g. Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [3] and Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [4]), for the
number of perturbed pixels (e.g. SparseFool [8]) or for the
total energy (e.g. DeepFool [6] and Carlini-Wagner (CW) [7])
of the adversarial image. These perturbations do not generally
transfer across classifiers [21] and do not defeat certified
defences [22] or empirical defences, such as input-based
transformations [16].
Content-based perturbations are defined based on image
properties, such as structures (EdgeFool [12]), colours (Se-
manticAdv [15]), or objects and colour perception (Color-
Fool [11]). These perturbations improve transferability and
robustness to empirical defences, and exceed the verification
capacity of certified defences [23]. However, some perturba-
tions may distort the image quality [11], [12].
A critical limitation of existing adversarial attacks is that
they flip the categorical label of an image, neglecting the
semantic relationship between labels [24]. This is problematic
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when the labels of the adversarial image and the clean image
are synonymous (e.g. screen and television). Furthermore,
highly specialised labels (e.g. 130 breeds of dogs are labelled
in ImageNet) may lead to a fine granularity that is indistin-
guishable for a non-expert [25].
In this paper, we propose an adversarial framework that
learns to craft image perturbations that mimic the effect of
traditional image processing filters. We also define a new
multi-task objective function that combines a structure loss and
a semantic adversarial loss to train a fully convolutional neural
network (FCNN) end-to-end. The structure loss supports the
learning of the properties of the selected image filter to control
the structure of the perturbation. The semantic adversarial loss
accounts for the relationships between labels and prevents
the classifier from predicting a synonymous or a semantically
similar category label. The proposed framework, FilterFool,
substantially extends our previous work [12] by learning the
residual of filters to generate different types of adversarial
enhancement and, by defining the semantic adversarial loss,
improves the effectiveness of adversarial attacks. We validate
FilterFool on ImageNet [26] with three object classifiers,
namely ResNet50, ResNet18 [27] and AlexNet [28] using Log
transformation, Gamma correction, and linear and non-linear
detail enhancement as filters.
II. BACKGROUND
Let I ∈ {0, ..., 255}W×H×3 be a colour image whose width,
in pixels, is W and height is H . Let yˆ ∈ {1, ..., D} be the
ground-truth class associate with I. Let a D-class classifier
trained over a loss function, J(·), consists of three sequential
parts: a backbone of layers that passes I through a series of
layers and outputs the logit values represented as a D × 1
matrix, z = (zi)Di=1, where zi ∈ R is the logit value of I being
associated with class i ∈ {1, ..., D}; a softmax operation that
normalises the logit values into a probability distribution to
predict the probability of all the classes, p = (pi)Di=1:
pi =
ezi
ΣDd=1e
zd
, (1)
where pi ∈ [0, 1] represents the probability of I being
associated with class i ∈ {1, ..., D} and ∑Di=1 pi = 1; an
argmax operation that predicts the (clean) class y ∈ {1, ..., D}
(corresponding to the strings of characters1 λ) as the most
likely of D classes:
y = arg max
i=1,...,D
pi. (2)
Note that y and yˆ are not always the same as classifiers are
not completely accurate in predicting the ground-truth classes.
1For example in the ImageNet dataset, y = 232 corresponds to
λ = “collie”.
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2TABLE I
COMPARISON OF FAST GRADIENT SIGN METHOD (FGSM) [3], BASIC
ITERATIVE METHOD (BIM) [4], DEEPFOOL [6], SPARSEFOOL [8],
CARLINI-WAGNER (CW) [7], SEMANTICADVERSARIAL (SEMADV) [15],
COLORFOOL [11], EDGEFOOL [12] AND OUR PROPOSED ADVERSARIAL
FRAMEWORK, FILTERFOOL, IN TERMS OF THE IMAGE KNOWLEDGE USED
IN THE DESIGN OF THE ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATIONS AND
CONSIDERATION OF SEMANTIC RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CLASSES.
FILTERFOOL-C IS A BASELINE FOR OUR PROPOSED FRAMEWORK, IN
WHICH THE SEMANTIC ADVERSARIAL LOSS FUNCTION IS REPLACED BY
THE CW ADVERSARIAL LOSS FUNCTION.
Ref Method
Adversarial perturbations Classes
Bound Content Semantics
l0 l1 l2 l∞ Colour Objects Structure
[3] FGSM
[4] BIM
[6] DeepFool
[8] SparseFool
[7] CW
[15] SemAdv
[11] ColorFool
[12] EdgeFool
FilterFool-c
FilterFool
An adversarial perturbation, δ ∈ ZW×H×3, modifies I to
generate an adversarial example, I˙ ∈ {0, ..., 255}W×H×3, as
I˙ = I+ δ, (3)
so that its (adversarial) class, y˙ ∈ {1, ..., D} (corresponding to
the strings of characters λ˙), assigned by the classifier differs2
from that of I:
y˙ 6= y, (4)
where the logit values, probability and the predicted class
of the adversarial image are z˙ = (z˙i)Di=1, p˙ = (p˙i)
D
i=1 and
y˙ = arg maxi=1,...,D p˙i, respectively.
In this section, we will discuss how norm-bounded and
content-based attacks craft δ. The properties of these attacks
are summarised in Tab. I, and compared with the properties
of FilterFool.
FGSM [3] determines whether to increase or decrease the
value of each pixel of I by a small  ∈ N based on the sign
of ∇IJ(·), the gradient of the loss function with respect to I:
I˙FGSM = I+  sign (∇IJ (I, y))︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ
. (5)
The adversarial image generated by FGSM, I˙FGSM, is in
the -neighbourhood of I. BIM [4] extends FGSM by iter-
atively generating the adversarial perturbation by aggregating
N = bmin(+ 4, 1.25)e, where b·e is a rounding operation
to the nearest integer, perturbations δn as
I˙BIM = CI,(I+
N∑
n=1
δn︸ ︷︷ ︸
I˙N
), (6)
where the clipping operation, CI,(·), clips the pixel intensities
of the adversarial image with respect to three constant images,
2In this work, we focus on improving untargeted attacks.
E, 0 and 255, whose pixel intensities are , 0 and 255,
respectively:
CI,(I˙N ) = min{255, I+E,max{0, I−E, I˙N}}, (7)
and
δn = sign
(∇I+δn−1J (I+ δn−1, y)) . (8)
The iterative process helps BIM exploit finer perturbations
that improve, compared to FGSM, the ability of the attack
to mislead the classifier.
CW [7] minimises the l0, l2 or l∞ norm of the difference
between the original image, I, and the adversarial image, I˙,
and the difference between the logit value, z˙y , of I˙ belonging
to the same class as I and the maximum logit value among
all the other classes:
I˙CW = arg min
I˙
(‖I˙−I‖p+cI(z˙y− max
i=1,...,D
{z˙i; i 6= y})
)
, (9)
where p ∈ {0, 2,∞} and cI > 0 is a constant determined via
line search.
DeepFool [6] iteratively generates an adversarial perturba-
tion whose l2 norm is bounded. The adversarial perturbation
at each iteration is the orthogonal projection of the adversarial
image from the previous iteration onto the closest linearised
boundary of class y in the decision space. SparseFool [8]
combines the DeepFool adversarial approach and the low mean
curvature of DNNs in the neighbourhood of each image to
perturb only a few pixels, thus resulting in sparse adversarial
perturbations with a small l1 norm.
SemanticAdv [15] generates adversarially colourised images
in the HSV colour space by adding to the hue and saturation
of I a random perturbation chosen uniformly from the range
of valid values. SemanticAdv draws new perturbations, up to
1000 attempts, until the classifier is misled. The SemanticAdv
adversarial image, I˙SA, is:
I˙SA = β
−1
(
[IH + δH , IS + δS , IV ]
)
, (10)
where β(·) converts I to its hue, IH , saturation, IS , and
value, IV components; [·, ·, ·] represents the channel-wise
concatenation; and δH ∈ [0, 1]W×H and δS ∈ [0, 1]W×H
are the final perturbations on the hue and saturation channels,
respectively. Because IH and IS are changed by the same
amount, the colours of I˙SA may look unnatural.
ColorFool [11] improves the naturalness of adversarial
images compared to SemanticAdv [15] by identifying non-
sensitive and sensitive regions through semantic segmentation.
The perturbations operate on the a and b channels of the Lab
colour space: the perturbations of S non-sensitive regions are
drawn randomly from the whole range of possible values,
whereas the perturbations of S sensitive regions are cho-
sen randomly from pre-defined natural-colour ranges, defined
based on human perception. The ColorFool adversarial image,
I˙CF, is:
I˙CF = ρ
−1
( S∑
t=1
(
ρ(St) +Nt
)
+
S∑
t=1
(
ρ(St) +Nt
))
, (11)
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Fig. 1. Overview of FilterFool that integrates a selected image filter type with
a fully convolutional neural network to output semantic adversarial images (
forward pass; backward pass).
where ρ(·) is the RGB-to-Lab colour-space conversion and
Nt and Nt are the colour perturbations of the t-th sensitive,
St, and non-sensitive, St, regions, respectively.
Finally, EdgeFool [12] generates adversarial perturbations
that enhance the image details. EdgeFool trains a FCNN,
RθEF(·), where θEF represents all the parameters defining the
FCNN, with a multi-task loss function:
θ∗EF = arg min
θEF
( ‖RθEF(I)− Ig‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ls(·)
+c(z˙y −max{z˙i; i 6= y})
)
,
(12)
where Ls(·), the smoothing loss function, quantifies the dif-
ference between Ig , the output of a smoothing filter, and
Is = RθEF(I), the output of the FCNN. The adversarial
perturbation operates on the L channel of the Lab colour space
by enhancing the image details, Id = I−Is, using the sigmoid
operation, f(a, b) =
(
1 + e−ab
)−1 − 0.5 [29]:
I˙L =
(
100f
(
ILs − v1
100
, v2
)
+ v1
)
+ 100f
(
ILd
100
, v3
)
, (13)
where the input to the sigmoid operation is normalised by the
maximum value of the L channel (i.e. 100), and v1, v2 and v3
are constants that adjust the midpoint and slope of the sigmoid.
The second term in Eq. 12 guides the FCNN to smooth the
image in a way that the EdgeFool adversarial image, I˙EF:
I˙EF = ρ
−1
(
[I˙L, Ia, Ib]
)
, (14)
causes misclassification.
III. FILTERFOOL
FilterFool consists of a FCNN, Fθ(·), which learns to mimic
the output of an image filter and generates a content-aware ad-
versarial perturbation (Fig. 1). The learning of the parameters
of Fθ(·) is driven by a structure loss, which accounts for the
difference between the intensity changes introduced by the
filter and the learned adversarial perturbation, induced by an
adversarial loss, which operates on semantic labels. The errors
captured by the two losses are backpropagated to optimise
the parameters of Fθ(·). The structure loss and the semantic
adversarial loss are discussed next.
A. Structure loss
We encourage Fθ(·) to learn to mimic the behaviour
of the selected image filter through residual learning. Let
Ie ∈ {0, ..., 255}W×H×3 be the filtered version of I. We
measure the difference between the residual, δe = Ie − I, and
the adversarial perturbation, δ, which is the output of Fθ(·).
To tailor the perturbation towards the output of the selected
filter, we define Ll2(·, ·), which penalises large errors between
δ and δe:
Ll2(δ, δe) = ‖δ − δe‖2. (15)
As Ll2(·, ·) measures the errors in a pixel-wise manner,
using this loss alone may result in artefacts, especially in
untextured regions [30]. We thus consider also another loss:
LSSIM(δ, δe) = 1− SSIM(δ, δe) (16)
that depends on the Structural Similarity Index Metric
(SSIM) [31]:
SSIM(δ, δe) = l(δ, δe) · c(δ, δe) · s(δ, δe), (17)
where l(·, ·) is a function of the means:
l(δ, δe) =
2µδµδe + c1
µ2δ + µ
2
δe
+ c1
, (18)
where µδ = 1M
∑M
i=1 δi and δi ∈ δ is the i-th pixel intensity
of δ that contains M = W ×H × 3 pixels. c(·, ·), is based on
the standard deviations:
c(δ, δe) =
2σδσδe + c2
σ2δ + σ
2
δe
+ c2
, (19)
where σδ =
(
1
M−1
∑M
i=1(δi − µδ)2
)1/2
. The structure infor-
mation, s(·, ·), is estimated based on the covariance of the
perturbations:
s(δ, δe) =
σδδe + c3
σδσδe + c3
, (20)
where σδδe =
1
M−1
∑M
i=1(δi − µδ)(δi − µδe). c1, c2
and c3 are small constants that stabilise the division.
SSIM(δ, δe) ∈ [0, 1], and the closer to 1, the higher the
similarity.
We combine the two losses in the structure loss, LStr(·, ·),
defined as
LStr(δ, δe) = Ll2(δ, δe) + ηLSSIM(δ, δe), (21)
where the hyper-parameter η is determined empirically.
FilterFool is a general approach and, in this paper, we
consider three filter types, namely Log transformation, Gamma
correction, and detail enhancement. The Log transformation
expands the darker pixel values and compresses the brighter
pixel values by replacing them with their logarithm [32].
Gamma correction modifies each pixel value through an ex-
ponent, 1/γ, with a tunable value such that γ < 1 darkens the
image, and γ > 1 brightens the image [32]. Finally, for detail
enhancement, we use an l0 structure-preserving smoothing fil-
ter [33]. The image details are linearly enhanced by α ∈ (0, 10]
in the RGB colour space as Ie = I+ αId. Regarding the non-
linear detail enhancement, we, following [29] and similarly to
EdgeFool (see Eq. 14), enhance the image details in the Lab
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Fig. 2. Comparison between the outputs of three traditional image filters
and FilterFool adversarial images. The text in the bottom right of each image
indicates the class predicted by ResNet50.
colour space using the sigmoid operation. Examples of results
for the three filter types and the corresponding FilterFool
images are shown in Fig. 2.
B. Semantic adversarial loss
We aim to define a semantic adversarial loss, LS-Adv(·, ·),
that decreases the probability of classifying I˙ as any class
that is semantically similar to the class of I. We consider
the semantics of classes in the learning of the perturbations
to account for synonymous or similar classes (e.g. screen &
television, computer keyboard & typewriter keyboard), highly
detailed categorisations (e.g. breeds of dogs), and the ground-
truth class when it is different than the clean predicted class.
Some examples are shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4.
To devise LS-Adv(·, ·), we define the matrix W ∈ {0, 1}D×S
that maps D categorical labels into S semantic classes: cate-
gorical labels identified with a 1 in column ws ∈ {0, 1}D of
W belong to the same semantic class s. For example, to define
W, we consider S = 11 semantic classes generated through
WordNet from the D = 1000 ImageNet classes [25]. The
semantic classes (and the number of classes that they contain)
are Dogs (130); Other mammals (88); Birds (59); Reptiles,
fish, amphibians (60); Invertebrates (61); Food, plants, fungi
(63); Devices (172); Structures, furnishing (90); Clothes, cov-
ering (92); Implements, containers, misc. objects (117); and
Vehicles (68).
Given W, for the clean image I and the clean predicted
label, y, coming from the semantic class s, we present
LS-Adv(·, ·) to generate an adversarial image, I˙, that considers
y and all those semantically similar classes to y:
LS-Adv(I˙, I) =< ReLU(z˙),ws > −max(z˙ wˆs), (22)
where wˆs = 1 − ws represents all other classes that are
semantically different than y, 1 = {1}D, < ·, · > is a
dot product and  is a Hadamard product. LS-Adv(·, ·) is an
C: screen
A: television
C: computer keyboard
A: typewriter keyboard
C: Shetland sheepdog
A: collie
Fig. 3. Sample clean images from the ImageNet dataset that contain objects
with several synonymous classes and object whose class is hard to determine
by non-expert human classifiers. Existing attackers [3], [4], [6], [8], [7], [15],
[11], [12] mislead classifiers by changing the clean class (C) to the adversarial
class (A) without delving into their semantic relationships.
C: tup
A=G: bighorn
C: Egyptian cat
A=G: tabby
C: wing
A=G: warplane
Fig. 4. Sample clean images from the ImageNet dataset whose predicted
classes by ResNet50 are different from the ground-truth classes. Existing
attackers [3], [4], [6], [8], [7], [15], [11], [12] mislead classifiers by changing
the clean class (C) to the adversarial class (A) that are the same as the ground-
truth class (G) as they neglect the semantic relationships between the classes.
adaptation of the CW adversarial loss function [7], to account
for the semantics of the classes. We apply a ReLU to z˙ to
affect those semantically similar classes to y with positive logit
values that are computed by the dot product with wˆs. Instead,
we increase the logit value of a semantically different class
than y. In each iteration, we choose the class that contains the
largest logit values among the semantically different classes to
reach misleading within fewer iterations. See as an example
Fig. 5.
C. Multi-task loss
We define our objective function, L, as the combination of
the structure loss, LStr(·, ·), and the semantic adversarial loss,
LS-Adv(·, ·):
L = LStr(δ, δe) + LS-Adv(I˙, I). (23)
By minimising this multi-task loss, L, the FCNN generates
filtered adversarial images that are semantically misclassified.
During the perturbation generation process, the FCNN learns
to generate δ iteratively, by backpropagating both the structure
loss, LStr, and the semantic adversarial loss, LS-Adv until I˙
semantically misleads the classifier and LStr < τ . We set
the stopping threshold τ empirically to make δ close to δe,
enabling enhancement.
Fig. 6 compares perturbations generated by FilterFool,
exploiting different filters, with perturbations generated by
both norm-bounded and content-based methods. lp norm-
bounded adversarial perturbations of BIM, DeepFool and
SparseFool are unrelated to the content of the image, thus
making them removable by defence frameworks that exploit
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Fig. 5. The overview of the proposed semantic adversarial loss function, as
well as categorical to semantic mapping of the classes. The first row shows
the clean image and its logit values predicted by ResNet50. The generated
adversarial image and its logit values predicted by ResNet50 are shown
in the second row. Colours represent semantically similar classes namely
Dogs, Other mammals, Bird, Reptiles,fish, amphibians, Invertebrates, Food,
plants, fungi, Devices, Structures, furnishing, Clothes, covering, Implements,
containers, misc. objects, Vehicles. The proposed semantic adversarial loss
function minimises the positive logit values of the classes that are semantically
similar to the clean class (i.e. Dogs), while increasing the logit value of a class
that is semantically different than the clean class.
BIM DeepFool SparseFool SemanticAdv
ColorFool EdgeFool FilterFool (ND) FilterFool (LT)
FilterFool (LD, 1) FilterFool (LD, 1.5) FilterFool (GC, 0.5) FilterFool (GC, 1.5)
Fig. 6. Comparison of adversarial perturbations generated for the right-
most image of Fig. 3. Values are scaled between 0 and 255. KEYS –
LD: linear detail enhancement; ND: nonlinear detail enhancement; LT: Log
Transformation; GC: Gamma Correction.
input-based transformations. The SemanticAdv and ColorFool
perturbations modify the colours. The EdgeFool adversarial
perturbation enhances the image details. However, FlexiFool
generates various content-based adversarial perturbations that
can enhance the image.
Fig. 7 shows a sample clean image, adversarial images, and
the visualisation of the Gradient-weighted Class Activation
Clean BIM DeepFool SparseFool
Shetland sheepdog
collie
German shepherd
Pembroke
Australian terrier
collie
German shepherd
borzoi
Shetland sheepdog
Border collie
collie
Shetland sheepdog
German shepherd
borzoi
Border collie
collie
Shetland sheepdog
German shepherd
Australian terrier
Pembroke
SemAdv ColorFool EdgeFool FilterFool (ND)
collie
Shetland sheepdog
Border collie
borzoi
malamute
collie
Shetland sheepdog
Border collie
borzoi
German shepherd
collie
Shetland sheepdog
Australian terrier
German shepherd
Border collie
peacock
tarantula
window screen
wallaby
trash can
FilterFool (LT) FilterFool (GC) FilterFool (LD) FilterFool (LD)
mask
binoculars
sunscreen
koala
sunglasses
mask
totem pole
trash can
spatula
panpipe
spatula
cleaver
shovel
hammer
hatchet
mask
peacock
orangutan
cock
carousel
Fig. 7. Example of adversarial attacks, attention and Top5 predictions by
ResNet50 classifier. The heatmap colour from blue to red represents the least
and the most important region (i.e. intensities of these pixels have the least
and most impact on the prediction score) to the classifier, respectively.
Mapping (Grad-CAM3) [34], and the Top5 predicted classes
3Grad-CAM backwards the gradient to the last convolutional layer to
determine the importance of each neuron in that layer for the current predicted
class. The Grad-CAM heatmap of the last convolutional layer is computed
as the weighted sum of the activation of the neurons multiplied by their
importance, followed by up-sampling to the input size to highlight the
importance of the image.
6with ResNet50. Perturbations generated by BIM, DeepFool,
SparseFool, SemanticAdv, ColorFool, and EdgeFool change
the most-likely predicted class to a semantically close class
(another breed of dogs), whereas FilterFool generates adver-
sarial images that are misclassified as semantically different
adversarial classes. FilterFool can even distract the attention
locations of ResNet50, for example, from the face of the dog to
the background in the third image of the last row thus the clean
class and those semantically similar classes to the clean class
move to the bottom of the prediction list. However, the clean
class is still in the Top2 predicted class of other adversarial
images as ResNet50 still focuses on the dog (mainly the face).
A detailed analysis of the FilterFool results is presented in
the next section.
IV. VALIDATION
We consider six state-of-the-art attacks, which include
norm-bounded and content-based approaches: Basic Iterative
Method (BIM) [4], DeepFool [6], SparseFool [8], Semanti-
cAdv [15], ColorFool [11] and EdgeFool [12]. We evaluate
FilterFool instantiations with, as traditional filter, Gamma
correction, Log transformation, and linear and nonlinear detail
enhancement. To analyse the impact of the proposed semantic
adversarial loss function, we use FilterFool-c, a modification
of the proposed framework where the semantic adversarial
loss function of FilterFool is replaced with the second term
of the CW [7] loss function (Eq. 9). We consider three state-
of-the-art classifiers (ResNet with 50 layers (ResNet50) and 18
layers (ResNet18) [27], and AlexNet [28]) trained for image
classification task on ImageNet [26], which includes 1,000
classes. To perform the evaluation, we consider the same 3,000
images (3 images per class) that are randomly selected from
the validation set by [11], [12].
A. Implementation details
We instantiate the architecture of Fθ(·) from the one imple-
mented in [12], [35]. The dimensions of I are 224× 224× 3.
The architecture consists of 7 convolution layers with 24
intermediate feature maps and kernels of size 3× 3. The last
convolution layer applies a 1×1 convolution that generates Is.
The dilation factor of each layer is set to 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 1,
and 1, respectively. A Leaky Rectified Linear Unit (L-ReLU)
is applied after padding and normalising each intermediate
convolutional layer, except the last one. The hyper-parameter
η = 0.01 is chosen empirically. The stopping threshold τ
is set 0.04, 0.003 and 0.0005 for detail enhancement, Log
transformation and Gamma correction, respectively. For linear
detail enhancement and Gamma correction, α and γ range
from 0.1 to 10. For the parameters of the sigmoid operation in
nonlinear detail enhancement, we adopt the value used in [29],
[12]: v1 = 56, v2 = 1, and v3 = 15.
B. Performance evaluation measures
We compare the categorical, semantic, and TopK success
rate, the semantic damage, the accuracy of the classifier on
adversarial images, the transferability to unseen classifiers, and
the robustness to classifiers equipped with defences.
The success rate at each rank, K, is the ratio between
the number of adversarial images whose most-likely predicted
classes are not among the first K predicted classes of their
corresponding clean images and the total number of images.
We consider categorical and semantic success rates: the Top1
categorical success rate is the ratio between adversarial classes
that are different than the clean classes, whereas the Top1
semantic success rate accepts only those adversarial classes
that are also semantically different than the clean classes based
on [25]. We define the success of adversarial images based on
the number of examples that change the semantic class based
on the strings of characters λ and λ˙, as opposed to the success
rate with respect to the categorical class.
We also compute the so called semantic damage of an
adversarial attack, similarly to [24]. We define the similarity
between two classes using the Wu-Palmar word similarity
metric [36], Wu(·, ·). A damage occurs when the semantic
similarity between the strings of characters of the clean label,
λ, and adversarial label, λ˙ is lower than a threshold, Ts,
representing the maximum semantic distance:
Wua =
{
1 Wu(λ, λ˙) < Ts
0 otherwise.
(24)
We then average Wua over the generated adversarial images.
As the predicted class by classifiers may differ from the
ground-truth class, we also compute the TopK accuracy of
classifiers on the clean and adversarial images. The TopK
accuracy of a classifier is the ratio between the number of
images whose ground-truth classes are among the first K
predicted classes and the total number of images.
To quantify the transferability, we report both the categori-
cal and semantic success rate of adversarial images generated
for a specific classifier in misleading other unseen classifiers.
We measure robustness as the categorical success rate
of adversarial images in the presence of empirical defence
frameworks that use input-based transformations such as bit
reduction [16], median smoothing [16] and JPEG compres-
sion with various parameters. For bit reduction and median
smoothing, similarly to [16], parameters are: 1 to 7 bits per
colour channel in steps of 1; kernel of (2 × 2), (3 × 3) and
(5×5) in which the median values in odd and even kernels are
the middle one and the mean of two middle ones, respectively.
The quality parameters of lossy JPEG compression are 25, 50,
75 and 100.
C. Discussion
Fig. 8 shows the effect of different filters used in FilterFool
and the influence of their strengths on the categorical success
rate and transferability. The two top lines (or points) and four
bottom lines (or points), in each plot, indicate the categorical
success rate against the classifier that adversarial images are
generated for and categorical transferability to other classifiers,
respectively. We observe that all versions of FilterFool (detail
enhancement, Gamma correction and Log transformation)
achieve a high categorical success rate in misleading all
three classifiers, ResNet50, ResNet18 and AlexNet. However,
the transferability decreases as the strength decreases. This
70 2 4 6 8 10
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Su
cc
es
s
ra
te
GC
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
LD
1
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
ND
1
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
LT
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Su
cc
es
s
ra
te
1 1.5 2 5 10
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
γ
Su
cc
es
s
ra
te
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
α
1
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
N
1
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
N
Fig. 8. The categorical success rate and transferability of FilterFool
( or ) and FilterFool-c ( or ) to understand the effect of type
and strength of selected filters, namely Nonlinear Detail enhancement (ND),
Log Transformation (LT), Gamma Correction (GC) with strength γ and Linear
Detail enhancement (LD) with strength α, as well as the proposed semantic
adversarial loss function. Adversarial images are generated against ResNet50,
ResNet18 and AlexNet in the first, second and third rows, respectively. Hence,
in each plot, the top two overlapped lines (or points) show the categorical
success rate when the classifier is seen, while other four bottom lines (or
points) show the transferability against unseen classifiers. Note that γ = 1
point in the Gamma correction plots corresponds to the clean images.
phenomenon reveals the importance of large perturbations for
the transferability of adversarial images that is also shown
in [15], [11]. Fig. 8 also compares the categorical success rate
and transferability of FilterFool and FilterFool-c for different
filters and strengths with lines (or squares) and dashed lines
(or triangles), respectively. In general, the semantic adversarial
loss improves the categorical transferability by 8%, as multiple
classifiers may classify an image categorically differently but
semantically similarly. The transferability improvement on
ResNet18 is more; this may be due to the similar in behaviours
of ResNet18 to ResNet50 with respect to the semantic classes.
In Fig. 9, we study the impact of filters in FilterFool on
the robustness against defence frameworks that exploit bit re-
duction, median smoothing and JPEG compression. Coloured
regions represent the range of categorical success rate in
the presence of various parameters of bit reduction, median
smoothing and JPEG compression, which are (1-7), (2,3,5)
and (25, 50, 75, 100), respectively. From the coloured region
covered by linear detail enhancement and Gamma correction in
Fig. 9, we observe that the robustness of FilterFool improves
by a large margin when the strength of filters increases. In
general, FilterFool with Gamma (=10) correction is the most
robust, misleading AlexNet with 96% success rate in the
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Fig. 9. Robustness of FilterFool-c and FilterFool to the defence frameworks.
The coloured areas are the categorical success rate of FilterFool-c and
FilterFool in the presence of the defence frameworks that use (1-7) bit
reduction, (2,3,5) median smoothing and (25,50,75,100) JPEG compression
against ResNet50 (R50), ResNet18 (R18) and AlexNet (AN) for all four
filters; Nonlinear Detail enhancement (ND), Log Transformation (LT), Gamma
Correction (GC), Linear Detail enhancement (LD) with different strengths. γ
and α are the strengths of GC and LD that range from 0.1 to 10.
presence of (1-7) bit reductions, (2,3,5) median smoothing
and (25, 50, 75, 100) JPEG compression. This demonstrates
the vulnerability of the current defences against large content-
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Fig. 10. Comparing the categorical (C) and semantic (S) success rates of
FilterFool ( or ) with its corresponding traditional filters ( or ):
Nonlinear Detail enhancement (ND), Log Transformation (LT), Gamma
Correction (GC), Linear Detail enhancement (LD) with strengths vary from
0.1 to 10 on the ImageNet dataset against ResNet50, ResNet18 and AlexNet.
FilterFool can generate any type and strength adversarial images with 100%
both categorically and semantically success rate against all three classifiers
(overlapped in the top of each plot).
γ=0.5 γ=1.5 γ=1.5 γ=2.5 γ=5 LT
α=0.1 α=0.5 α=1.5 α=2 α=5 ND
Fig. 11. Examples of filtered images outputted by Gamma correction with
strength γ, Log transformation (LT), linear detail enhancement with strength
(α) and Nonlinear Detail enhancement (ND).
based adversarial perturbations. Fig. 9 also shows that our
semantic adversarial loss function can improve the robustness
in comparison to the CW loss function, as we manipulate the
order and logit values of the predicted classes more than the
CW adversarial loss function.
Fig. 10 compares both the categorical and semantic success
rates of FilterFool with image enhancement filters. Classifiers,
especially ResNet50, can still correctly classify most of the
transformed images outputted by enhancement filters (sev-
eral examples shown in Fig. 11). For example, the success
rates of Log transformation, non-linear detail enhancement,
Gamma correction (strength=5) and linear detail enhancement
(strength=5) in misleading ResNet50 are 6%, 29%, 39% and
51%, respectively. However, FilterFool selectively enhances
images to achieve 100% success rate in misleading ResNet50,
ResNet18 and AlexNet, while generating visually similar
images to enhancement filters with any pre-defined filters and
strengths (remember Fig. 2 from the previous section).
TABLE II
COMPARING THE CATEGORICAL SUCCESS RATE AND TRANSFERABILITY
OF FILTERFOOL WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART ATTACKS ON THE IMAGENET
DATASET AGAINST RESNET50, RESNET18 AND ALEXNET. THE
CLASSIFIERS THAT ADVERSARIAL IMAGES ARE GENERATED FOR ARE
LISTED IN THE SECOND COLUMN (SC: SEEN CLASSIFIER), WHILE THE
TEST CLASSIFIERS FOR THE TRANSFERABILITY ARE LISTED ON THE FIRST
ROW (UC: UNSEEN CLASSIFIER).
Attack SC
UC ResNet50 ResNet18 AlexNet
BIM [4]
ResNet50 1.000 0.127 0.037
ResNet18 0.109 1.000 0.041
AlexNet 0.038 0.050 1.000
DeepFool [6]
ResNet50 0.983 0.071 0.018
ResNet18 0.055 0.991 0.017
AlexNet 0.019 0.031 0.967
SparseFool [8]
ResNet50 0.990 0.167 0.176
ResNet18 0.086 0.997 0.134
AlexNet 0.062 0.079 1.000
SemanticAdv [15]
ResNet50 0.890 0.540 0.770
ResNet18 0.422 0.931 0.757
AlexNet 0.359 0.431 0.994
ColorFool [11]
ResNet50 0.917 0.346 0.592
ResNet18 0.223 0.934 0.541
AlexNet 0.114 0.147 0.995
EdgeFool [12]
ResNet50 0.981 0.357 0.512
ResNet18 0.278 0.989 0.510
AlexNet 0.272 0.333 0.995
FilterFool (LT)
ResNet50 1.000 0.168 0.175
ResNet18 0.146 1.000 0.191
AlexNet 0.154 0.205 1.000
FilterFool (ND)
ResNet50 1.000 0.407 0.523
ResNet18 0.331 1.000 0.532
AlexNet 0.324 0.403 1.000
FilterFool (GC)
ResNet50 0.999 0.292 0.402
ResNet18 0.237 1.000 0.414
0.5 AlexNet 0.237 0.303 1.000
FilterFool (GC)
ResNet50 1.000 0.195 0.251
ResNet18 0.151 1.000 0.258
1.5 AlexNet 0.150 0.214 1.000
FilterFool (GC)
ResNet50 1.000 0.250 0.378
ResNet18 0.205 1.000 0.385
2.0 AlexNet 0.194 0.260 1.000
FilterFool (GC)
ResNet50 1.000 0.550 0.788
ResNet18 0.487 1.000 0.793
5.0 AlexNet 0.436 0.512 1.000
FilterFool (LD)
ResNet50 1.000 0.303 0.402
ResNet18 0.245 1.000 0.402
1.0 AlexNet 0.237 0.316 1.000
FilterFool (LD)
ResNet50 1.000 0.436 0.554
ResNet18 0.349 1.000 0.557
2.0 AlexNet 0.350 0.438 1.000
FilterFool (LD)
ResNet50 1.000 0.654 0.758
ResNet18 0.572 1.000 0.756
5.0 AlexNet 0.564 0.658 1.000
FilterFool (LD)
ResNet50 1.000 0.799 0.874
ResNet18 0.747 1.000 0.873
10.0 AlexNet 0.735 0.794 1.000
Tab. II reports the categorical success rate (on-diagonal
elements) and the transferability (off-diagonal elements) of
adversarial attacks. Although categorical success rate of all
attacks are close to 100%, bounding the lp norm of adversarial
perturbations highly limits the categorical transferability of
generated adversarial images. For example, although DeepFool
adversarial images on ResNet50 achieve 98.3% categorical
success rate, only 7.1% and 1.8% of them are transferable
to categorically mislead ResNet18 and AlexNet, respectively.
We study the semantic success rate (on-diagonal elements)
9TABLE III
ANALYSING THE SEMANTIC SUCCESS RATE AND TRANSFERABILITY OF
STATE-OF-THE-ART ATTACKS ON THE IMAGENET DATASET AGAINST
RESNET50, RESNET18 AND ALEXNET. THE CLASSIFIERS THAT
ADVERSARIAL IMAGES ARE GENERATED FOR ARE LISTED IN THE SECOND
COLUMN (SC: SEEN CLASSIFIER), WHILE THE TEST CLASSIFIERS FOR THE
TRANSFERABILITY ARE LISTED ON THE FIRST ROW (UC: UNSEEN
CLASSIFIER).
Attack SC
UC ResNet50 ResNet18 AlexNet
BIM [4]
ResNet50 0.405 0.052 0.015
ResNet18 0.045 0.425 0.019
AlexNet 0.015 0.021 0.480
DeepFool [6]
ResNet50 0.358 0.030 0.009
ResNet18 0.023 0.384 0.008
AlexNet 0.006 0.012 0.413
SparseFool [8]
ResNet50 0.390 0.073 0.087
ResNet18 0.034 0.408 0.065
AlexNet 0.024 0.030 0.441
SemanticAdv [15]
ResNet50 0.406 0.274 0.496
ResNet18 0.198 0.442 0.472
AlexNet 0.169 0.209 0.563
ColorFool [11]
ResNet50 0.400 0.170 0.380
ResNet18 0.100 0.426 0.331
AlexNet 0.048 0.062 0.476
EdgeFool [12]
ResNet50 0.374 0.165 0.273
ResNet18 0.126 0.407 0.262
AlexNet 0.119 0.149 0.483
and transferability (off-diagonal elements) of state-of-the-
art attacks in Tab. III. The predicted classes of more than
50% of adversarial images generated by each state-of-the-
art attack are semantically similar to the predicted classes
of their corresponding clean images (see on-diagonal ele-
ments of Tab. III). Tab. IV compares the semantic success
rate (on-diagonal elements) and transferability (off-diagonal
elements) of FilterFool. The semantic success rates of all
types of FilterFool, similarly to categorical success rate in
Tab. II, are 100%. FilterFool can generate highly transferable
(both categorical and semantic) adversarial images using large
content-based perturbations that mimic Gamma correction and
linear detail enhancement. For example, the FilterFool (with
linear detail enhancement filter and strength α = 5) adversarial
images generated on ResNet50 with 100% success rate are
transferable in categorically misleading ResNet18 and AlexNet
with 65.4% and 75.8%, while the transferability of one of the
strongest state-of-the-art adversarial attack such as ColorFool
are 34.6% and 59.2%. In general, the semantic transferability
of adversarial attacks are less than the categorical transfer-
ability. Consequently, improving the semantic transferability of
adversarial attacks is an important direction for future research.
To understand better why the semantic success rate of state-
of-the-art attacks are low, we visualise the confusion-matrix
of clean and adversarial classes in Fig. 12. The adversarial
classes of the images generated by state-of-the-art attacks
are semantically remarkably close to the classes of their
corresponding clean images. For example, 336, 352, 342,
351, 319, 317 of the adversarial images generated by BIM,
DeepFool, SparseFool, EdgeFool, SemanticAdv and Color-
Fool, respectively, for (clean) 390 dog images are misclassified
as another breed of dogs. In general, state-of-the-art attacks
rarely induce misleading, semantically separate classes than
TABLE IV
THE SEMANTIC SUCCESS RATE AND TRANSFERABILITY OF FILTERFOOL
ON THE IMAGENET DATASET AGAINST RESNET50, RESNET18 AND
ALEXNET. THE CLASSIFIERS THAT ADVERSARIAL IMAGES ARE
GENERATED FOR ARE LISTED IN THE SECOND COLUMN (SC: SEEN
CLASSIFIER), WHILE THE TEST CLASSIFIERS FOR THE TRANSFERABILITY
ARE LISTED ON THE FIRST ROW (UC: UNSEEN CLASSIFIER).
Attack SC
UC ResNet50 ResNet18 AlexNet
FilterFool (LT)
ResNet50 1.000 0.085 0.082
ResNet18 0.069 1.000 0.093
AlexNet 0.065 0.094 1.000
FilterFool (ND)
ResNet50 1.000 0.221 0.287
ResNet18 0.173 1.000 0.299
AlexNet 0.148 0.204 1.000
FilterFool (GC)
ResNet50 0.999 0.149 0.206
ResNet18 0.118 1.000 0.211
0.5 AlexNet 0.111 0.145 1.000
FilterFool (GC)
ResNet50 1.000 0.096 0.119
ResNet18 0.074 1.000 0.126
1.5 AlexNet 0.067 0.100 1.000
FilterFool (GC)
ResNet50 1.000 0.124 0.184
ResNet18 0.099 1.000 0.187
2.0 AlexNet 0.086 0.121 1.000
FilterFool (GC)
ResNet50 1.000 0.318 0.505
ResNet18 0.279 1.000 0.501
5.0 AlexNet 0.230 0.276 1.000
FilterFool (LD)
ResNet50 1.000 0.153 0.209
ResNet18 0.121 1.000 0.212
1.0 AlexNet 0.103 0.151 1.000
FilterFool (LD)
ResNet50 1.000 0.238 0.303
ResNet18 0.181 1.000 0.306
2.0 AlexNet 0.178 0.228 1.000
FilterFool (LD)
ResNet50 1.000 0.418 0.495
ResNet18 0.343 1.000 0.496
5.0 AlexNet 0.337 0.416 0.999
FilterFool (LD)
ResNet50 1.000 0.585 0.647
ResNet18 0.527 1.000 0.653
10.0 AlexNet 0.504 0.585 1.000
most of the clean classes including Dogs, Birds, Fish and
Vehicles. Fig. 12 shows that 50% semantic success rates of the
state-of-the-art attacks reported in Tab. II, are due to confusion
between Devices and Containers. We also show the confusion
matrices of different variants of FilterFool in Fig. 12 to analyse
the impact of the structure (and strength) imposed by the
traditional filters on the semantic adversarial performance. The
similarity between confusion matrices of different variants of
FilterFool, for example on-diagonal zeros and similar off-
diagonal values, show that the semantic success of FilterFool
is a consequence of our proposed adversarial loss function.
Fig. 13 compares the semantic damage of adversarial at-
tacks for varying values of the semantic similarity threshold.
For each threshold value, the semantic damage metric only
accepts the misleading when the semantic similarity of an
adversarial class and its corresponding clean class are less
than that value. In general, increasing the threshold increases
the semantic damage of an attack. FilterFool inflicts greater
semantic damage on all three classifiers than other attacks as
adversarial classes of FilterFool are semantically very far from
the clean classes.
Fig. 14 shows the TopK categorical success rate of the
attacks. As K increases, the categorical success rate of most of
the adversarial attacks substantially decreases. This shows that
attacks mostly shift the clean class from the first probable to
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Fig. 12. Confusion matrices that show the success rate of adversarial
attacks per semantic class against ResNet50. Rows and columns show the
semantic class of the clean and adversarial images, namely Dogs (s1),
other mammals (s2), Bird (s3), Reptiles, fish, amphibians (s4), Invertebrates
(s5), Food, plants, fungi (s6), Devices (s7), Structures, furnishing (s8),
Clothes, covering (s9), Implements, containers, misc. objects (s10), Vehicles
(s11) generated by BIM, DeepFool, SparseFool, EdgeFool, SemanticAdv,
ColorFool, Nonlinear Detail enhancement (ND) of traditional filter, ND of
FilterFool-c, and FilterFool with ND, linear detail enhancement (LD), and
Gamma correction (GC) filters. The on-diagonal elements of the matrices
show that ResNet50 is still able to classify adversarial images of state-of-
the-art attacks, Filter and FilterFool-c with semantically similar classes to the
classes of the clean images.
other higher ranks. However, the TopK categorical success
rate of FilterFool only drops to 73%, 80% and 93% for
ResNet50, ResNet18 and AlexNet, respectively, when the K
ranges from 1 to 100 as a consequence of our semantic
adversarial loss function.
Tab. V shows the Top1 and Top5 accuracy of ResNet50,
ResNet18, AlexNet on the clean and adversarial images. The
(Top1 and Top5) accuracy on the clean images with ResNet50,
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Fig. 13. Semantic damage incurred by Basic Iterative method (BI), DeepFool
(DF), SparseFool (SF), EdgeFool (EF), SemanticAdv (SA), ColorFool (CF),
Nonlinear detail enhancement of FilterFool-c (FF-c) and FilterFool (FF) using
three thresholds, Ts: 0.3 , 0.5 and 0.7 against ResNet50, ResNet18
and AlexNet trained on the ImageNet dataset. For each pair of clean and
adversarial image, the semantic damage is 1 only when the semantic similarity,
measured by the word similarity metric (Eq. 24), between the adversarial class
and clean class is less than the chosen Ts.
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Fig. 14. TopK categorical success rate of BIM , DeepFool ,
SparseFool , EdgeFool , SemanticAdv , ColorFool ,
Nonlinear detail enhancement of FilterFool-c and FilterFool
against ResNet50, ResNet18 and AlexNet trained on ImageNet.
TABLE V
TOP1 AND TOP5 CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY (↓) WITH RESPECT TO THE
CATEGORICAL LABELS. RESNET50, RESNET18 AND ALEXNET ARE
EVALUATED ON THE CLEAN IMAGES AND ADVERSARIAL IMAGES.
Images ResNet50 ResNet18 AlexNetTop1 Top5 Top1 Top5 Top1 Top5
Clean 0.726 0.906 0.650 0.868 0.517 0.753
BIM [4] 0.082 0.482 0.091 0.388 0.094 0.431
DeepFool [6] 0.115 0.693 0.109 0.618 0.140 0.641
SparseFool [8] 0.097 0.899 0.097 0.843 0.106 0.716
SemanticAdv [15] 0.156 0.760 0.117 0.705 0.057 0.452
ColorFool [11] 0.160 0.872 0.141 0.827 0.106 0.707
EdgeFool [12] 0.085 0.840 0.079 0.784 0.073 0.613
FilterFool-c 0.085 0.814 0.086 0.767 0.084 0.607
FilterFool 0.006 0.026 0.004 0.024 0.004 0.012
ResNet18 and AlexNet are (72.6% and 90.6%), (65.0% and
86.8%) and (51.7% and 75.3%), respectively. The accuracy of
all three classifiers are still high on adversarial images that
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TABLE VI
ROBUSTNESS↑ OF ADVERSARIAL IMAGES OF BIM, DEEPFOOL (DF), SPARSEFOOL (SF), SEMANTICADV (SA), COLORFOOL (CF) AND VARIOUS
VERSION OF FILTERFOOL (FF) (LINEAR AND NONLINEAR DETAIL ENHANCEMENT (LD) AND (ND), LOG TRANSFORMATION (LT) AND GAMMA
CORRECTION (GC)) ON THE IMAGENET DATASET FOR RESNET50 (R50), RESNET18 (R18) AND ALEXNET (A) CLASSIFIERS. DEFENCE FRAMEWORKS
EXPLOIT BIT REDUCTION WITH {1,...,7}-BIT, MEDIAN SMOOTHING WITH 2× 2, 3× 3 AND 5× 5 KERNELS AND JPEG COMPRESSION WITH QUALITY
PARAMETERS 25, 50, 75 AND 100 (Q-25, Q-50, Q-75 AND Q-100).
Method Model Bit reduction Median smoothing JPEG compression1-bit 2-bit 3-bit 4-bit 5-bit 6-bit 7-bit 2× 2 3× 3 5× 5 q-25 q-50 q-75 q-100
BIM [4]
R50 0.933 0.622 0.527 0.687 0.809 0.859 0.870 0.509 0.465 0.462 0.381 0.402 0.504 0.837
R18 0.951 0.702 0.697 0.832 0.911 0.935 0.945 0.663 0.591 0.553 0.466 0.533 0.686 0.936
A 0.927 0.780 0.784 0.880 0.924 0.939 0.943 0.649 0.656 0.663 0.569 0.653 0.771 0.927
DF [6]
R50 0.937 0.625 0.371 0.329 0.345 0.357 0.362 0.304 0.342 0.412 0.348 0.377 0.362 0.364
R18 0.953 0.683 0.465 0.455 0.481 0.495 0.499 0.388 0.399 0.481 0.426 0.466 0.488 0.499
A 0.922 0.733 0.553 0.584 0.605 0.614 0.614 0.431 0.506 0.602 0.472 0.527 0.600 0.600
SF [8]
R50 0.941 0.619 0.386 0.346 0.422 0.548 0.714 0.180 0.226 0.372 0.363 0.312 0.293 0.328
R18 0.956 0.690 0.455 0.403 0.497 0.638 0.786 0.210 0.280 0.432 0.423 0.358 0.333 0.397
A 0.929 0.783 0.650 0.719 0.831 0.911 0.959 0.382 0.462 0.605 0.502 0.477 0.521 0.698
SA [15]
R50 0.958 0.809 0.701 0.716 0.768 0.830 0.866 0.652 0.697 0.783 0.676 0.662 0.667 0.737
R18 0.975 0.873 0.783 0.787 0.835 0.875 0.909 0.715 0.754 0.813 0.730 0.712 0.712 0.782
A 0.971 0.923 0.903 0.919 0.949 0.977 0.987 0.869 0.888 0.922 0.840 0.846 0.869 0.914
CF [11]
R50 0.946 0.785 0.654 0.618 0.675 0.763 0.831 0.546 0.622 0.740 0.664 0.607 0.606 0.614
R18 0.967 0.824 0.686 0.642 0.683 0.768 0.843 0.609 0.667 0.771 0.684 0.637 0.613 0.617
A 0.951 0.861 0.761 0.743 0.808 0.888 0.929 0.684 0.740 0.828 0.732 0.693 0.703 0.735
EF [12]
R50 0.950 0.610 0.560 0.639 0.806 0.917 0.966 0.397 0.433 0.490 0.516 0.511 0.519 0.691
R18 0.963 0.677 0.633 0.723 0.861 0.942 0.975 0.461 0.483 0.545 0.581 0.563 0.586 0.756
A 0.929 0.819 0.820 0.904 0.959 0.981 0.990 0.585 0.598 0.628 0.714 0.749 0.795 0.888
FF (ND)
R50 0.953 0.642 0.667 0.880 0.986 0.999 1.000 0.474 0.485 0.520 0.507 0.541 0.621 0.990
R18 0.967 0.735 0.802 0.954 0.996 1.000 1.000 0.567 0.560 0.591 0.592 0.631 0.774 0.998
A 0.942 0.942 0.991 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.803 0.815 0.753 0.846 0.946 0.989 1.000
FF (LD)
R50 0.925 0.569 0.515 0.782 0.960 0.998 1.000 0.539 0.537 0.567 0.396 0.413 0.470 0.977
R18 0.949 0.657 0.668 0.890 0.987 0.999 1.000 0.633 0.637 0.654 0.472 0.536 0.663 0.994
1.0 A 0.935 0.881 0.973 0.998 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.855 0.880 0.826 0.695 0.799 0.912 1.000
FF (LD)
R50 0.934 0.617 0.630 0.877 0.986 0.998 1.000 0.637 0.640 0.660 0.471 0.499 0.591 0.985
R18 0.950 0.706 0.773 0.948 0.994 0.999 1.000 0.709 0.703 0.710 0.558 0.627 0.748 0.995
2.0 A 0.944 0.918 0.985 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.895 0.911 0.870 0.789 0.869 0.952 0.999
FF (LD)
R50 0.944 0.773 0.813 0.960 0.997 1.000 1.000 0.784 0.790 0.797 0.645 0.709 0.782 0.994
R18 0.955 0.830 0.888 0.981 0.998 1.000 1.000 0.817 0.814 0.810 0.718 0.781 0.877 0.997
5.0 A 0.955 0.955 0.996 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.946 0.949 0.916 0.893 0.946 0.987 1.000
FF (LT)
R50 0.926 0.592 0.413 0.616 0.902 0.992 0.999 0.437 0.428 0.501 0.357 0.330 0.363 0.965
R18 0.951 0.701 0.562 0.802 0.971 0.998 1.000 0.567 0.538 0.591 0.433 0.450 0.538 0.989
A 0.937 0.879 0.951 0.994 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.885 0.916 0.866 0.635 0.746 0.884 0.999
FF (GT)
R50 0.955 0.658 0.454 0.561 0.840 0.986 0.997 0.514 0.497 0.558 0.457 0.418 0.436 0.960
R18 0.968 0.728 0.579 0.729 0.946 0.995 0.998 0.656 0.637 0.651 0.516 0.514 0.572 0.985
0.5 A 0.969 0.887 0.928 0.994 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.902 0.915 0.875 0.728 0.794 0.898 0.999
FF (GT)
R50 0.925 0.668 0.425 0.610 0.900 0.992 1.000 0.445 0.437 0.508 0.366 0.336 0.366 0.972
R18 0.955 0.755 0.566 0.778 0.967 0.998 1.000 0.576 0.542 0.586 0.446 0.426 0.524 0.991
1.5 A 0.936 0.891 0.924 0.993 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.869 0.896 0.847 0.636 0.712 0.844 0.999
FF(GT)
R50 0.939 0.724 0.485 0.622 0.899 0.993 1.000 0.467 0.463 0.550 0.407 0.378 0.398 0.964
R18 0.963 0.795 0.622 0.781 0.965 0.998 1.000 0.598 0.585 0.627 0.495 0.467 0.541 0.990
2.0 A 0.943 0.902 0.940 0.995 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.888 0.909 0.871 0.689 0.756 0.873 1.000
are generated by all state-of-the-art attacks and FilterFool-c.
However, FilterFool drops the accuracy of all three classifier
close to zero. For example, Top1 and Top5 accuracy of
ResNet50 on the SparseFool adversarial images are 9.7% and
89.9%, but on the FilterFool adversarial images are 0.6% and
2.6%. This phenomenon reveals the importance of considering
semantic relationships between classes as classifiers are not
100% accurate in assigning the ground-truth classes to the
clean images.
Tab. VI reports the robustness of adversarial attacks to bit-
reduction (1 to 7 bits), median smoothing (squared kernels
of dimension 2, 3 and 5) and JPEG compression (with
quality parameters 25, 50, 75 and 100). Content-based at-
tacks are more robust than norm-bounded attacks, as high-
frequency norm-bounded perturbations can be easily removed
by these input-based transformations. For example, the most
effective parameter of bit-reduction, median smoothing and
JPEG compression drop the 89% success rate of SemanticAdv
against ResNet50 to 70.1%, 65.2% and 66.2%, respectively,
as SemanticAdv, similarly to other content-based attacks such
as ColorFool, generates large, low-frequency perturbations
as opposed to the high-frequency perturbations of BIM, in
which the categorical success rates are dropped to 52.7%,
50.9% and 38.1%, respectively. Some variants of the Filter-
Fool adversarial perturbations even improve the robustness
of existing content-based attacks: for example, the success
rate of the detail enhanced perturbations with α=5 against
ResNet50 equipped with bit-reduction, median smoothing and
JPEG compression are 77.3%, 78.4% and 64.5%, respectively.
Reducing the number of bits from 8 until 3 bits decreases
the categorical success rate of adversarial images. However,
the categorical success rate increases again for 2 and 1 bit as
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classifiers cannot classify correctly clean images with 2 and 1
bit.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed FilterFool, the first adversarial framework that
crafts adversarial perturbations based on the content of an
image and on the semantics of its label. FilterFool is flexible
and can incorporate different image filters to generate various
types of adversarial perturbations. These perturbations are
larger than those produced by norm-bounded methods, thereby
improving the transferability of the attacks to unseen classifiers
and their robustness against defences.
As future work, we will extend FilterFool to cope with
images that contain multiple objects whose labels are seman-
tically different.
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